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COMMENTS
LABOR LAw-LMRA-"HoT CARGO" CLAUSE AS A DEFENSE TO
SECONDARY BOYCOTT-In McAllister Transfer, Inc. 1 the National
Labor Relations Board decided to reconsider the question of "hot
1

no N.L.R.B.

1769 (1954).
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cargo" clauses. In this case, the Teamsters' union requested McAllister, a non-union cartage company, to recognize it as the bargaining representative of McAllister's emRloyees, and submitted a
proposed contract to the employer. When McAllister refused to
recognize the Teamsters, the union announced that the company
would be "shut off" from interlining freight. 2 Accordingly, the
Teamsters induced those of their members who were working for
three other carriers not to handle McAllister freight. Each of
these other carriers was a party to a cartage agreement with the
Teamsters union which contained a "hot cargo" clause. Despite
this clause, each of the other carriers posted a notice directing
their employees to handle all freight without discrimination.8
However, the employees were not disciplined when they refused to
heed these notices. McAllister was effectively "shut off" from
interlining freight until the district court issued an injunction
under section 10 (Z) of the amended National Labor Relations
Act. 4 The trial examiner found that the union action was not a
violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the amended NLRA,5 on the
grounds that the "hot cargo" clause in the cartage agreement
provided a meritorious defense. In making this decision, the trial
examiner relied on the Conway's Express6 and the Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Company 7 decisions. The National Labor Relations
Board disagreed with the trial examiner and held that the Teamsters had violated section 8 (b) (4) (A). In the process, the Board
wrote three separate opinions, the total effect of which was, and
still is, to render the status and validity of any particular "hot
cargo" clause in some doubt. It is the purpose of this comment to
examine the present state of the law on this subject.
2 "Interlining" of freight means receiving freight from interstate motor carriers for
delivery to its destination, or delivering freight to such carriers for further transportation.
McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1772 (1954).
8 The notice posted by Freightways (one of the secondary carriers) read as follows:
"Our Company is not having a labor dispute with any labor union. As a common carrier
holding authorities under Federal and State laws, we are required to transport all commodities properly tendered to us.
"Therefore, we direct all of our employees to handle freight received by us, without
discrimination as to shippers or motor carriers who may be interlining freight with us.
This includes freight which we originate and is destined beyond our line in which specific
routing is furnished to us by the shipper." The other tlvo secondary carriers published
substantially similar notices. McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1773-1774
(1954).
4 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 149, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160.
5 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (b) (4) (A).
6 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), affd. Rabouin v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 906.
7 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953).
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Secondary Boycotts and "Hot Cargo" Clauses

The term "secondary boycott" has a long and confusing history. It was so difficult to define precisely that Congress avoided
its use in the final draft of the Taft-Hartley Act, despite the fact
that the committee reports and floor debates all indicate that it
was the "secondary boycott" which section 8 (b) (4) (A) was intended to control. A simple example will illustrate a typical
secondary boycott: union U is attempting to organize company R
(primary employer). In order to put additional economic pressure on R, it goes to the employees of company A (secondary employer) and induces these employees to force A to cease doing
business with R until it recognizes U. 8
A "hot cargo clause" is a provision in the contract between U
and A (secondary employer) whereby A agrees that "it shall not
be cause for discharge if any employee . . . refuse to handle unfair goods. . . . The term 'unfair goods' as used in this Article
includes, but is not limited to, any goods or equipment transported, interchanged, handled or used by any carrier, whether
party to this agreement or not, at whose terminal or terminals or
place or places of business there is a controversy between such
carrier or its employees on the one hand, and a labor union on the
other hand. . . . " 9 The function of these clauses is to secure
permission from an employer to exert secondary pressure upon
any person doing business with the employer who has, or may
subsequently have, a dispute with the labor organization.
II.

State of the Law Prior to the McAllister Case

A. Period Prior to the Conway Case. It is not surprising to
find that, originally, the courts were generally quite willing to
enjoin secondary pressure.10 Judicial opinion set up various tests
s One of the best definitions of a secondary boycott was given by Judge Learned Hand
in IBEW, Local 501 v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 34 at 37, where he said: "The
gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who
alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its
aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will induce
the employer to give in to his employees' demands."
9 This is the language used in the cartage agreement which the trial examiner felt
constituted a valid defense to a violation of §8 (b) (4) (A) in the McAllister case. McAllister
Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1775 (1954). The term "unfair goods" is often used
interchangeably with the term "hot cargo."
10 CCH Lab. L. Rep., 4th ed., ,i239 at 701 (1955).
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to determine the legality or illegality of such action, but the result
of most of these tests was to limit union action severely.11
As federal laws were enacted, the situation began to change.
The Sherman Act12 was generally held to prohibit secondary boycotts when they obstructed interstate commerce.13 The Clayton
Act14 was held not to have changed this result15 but the Sherman
Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,1 6 as interpreted in United
States v. Hutcheson,17 at last made it clear that secondary action,
as such, was no longer subject to federal injunction and was not
unlawful under the Sherman Act. The Wagner Act,18 of course,
did not change the law as to secondary action, but the Taft-Hartley
Act has had a profound effect upon it.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that
Congress was aiming specifically at secondary action when it
placed section 8 (b) (4) (A) in Title I of the act. The precise
language used by Congress is of the utmost importance, for this
section does not proscribe only secondary action,1 9 nor does it
prohibit all secondary action. 20 However, the exact sweep of section 8 (b) (4) (A) is beyond the scope of this comment; 21 in the
subsequent discussion it is assumed that a violation of this section
has occurred, but for the existence of a "hot cargo" clause.
B. The Conway Doctrine and Its Ramifications. In Conway's Express the Board recognized that a "hot cargo" clause could
be a defense to a charge of violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A). Its
reasoning was to the effect that the Taft-Hartley Act does not
prohibit an employer from aiding a union by secondary action
and, by the same token, it does not prevent him from contracting
to aid, and then honoring his contract. Thus, since a "hot cargo"
11 Id. at 701-703.
12 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1-30.
13 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
14 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§52-53.
15 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
16 47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§101-115.

17

41 S.Ct. 172 (1921).
41 S.Ct. 172 (1921).

312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941).

1s 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §§151-168.
19 NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' Dist. Council, (9th Cir. 1954) 211 F.
(2d) 149.
20 See Administrative Ruling of General Counsel, Case No. 305, 30 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1952),
where it was held that an appeal by a union to consumers was not a secondary boycott
within the meaning of §8 (b) (4) (A).
21 For a concise discussion of the scope of §8 (b) (4) (A), see Torbert, "Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
of the Taft-Hartley Law: A Study in Statutory Interpretation," 8 RUTGERS L. REv. 344
(1954).
.
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clause was present, the Board reasoned that there was no "strike
or concerted refusal," an element essential to a finding of a violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A).22 This decision was affirmed by the
court of appeals. 23 However, the language used by the majority
of the court24 in discussing the question of the "hot cargo" clause
appears to have been dictum. The contract involved was entered
into prior to the effective date of the Taft-Hartley Act, 25 and, in
addition, the court held that "the embargo on Rabouin's goods
was the product solely of requests addressed to management or to
supervisory personnel. . . . The union thus did not 'encourage
the employees.' " 26 A key point in both the holding of the Board27
and the court was that the secondary employers acquiesced in the
request of the union not to handle the goods of the primary employer.
While it is submitted that the Conway case is not direct authority for the proposition that a "hot cargo" clause constitutes a
valid defense to a violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A), this cannot be
said as easily of the Board's decision in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.28
In holding that the clause was a valid defense, the Board there
added another argument to those advanced in the Conway case.
This argument was to the effect that the collective agreement involved defined the secondary employees' "course of . . . employment" and the "hot cargo" clause simply removed the handling
of "unfair goods" from this "course of employment.''29 In addition to this new argument, the Board reiterated that "consent in
advance to honor a hot cargo clause is not the product of the
22 Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949). The precise holding in this case is difficult to ascertain, for there were three partial dissents. However, only Member Reynolds
clearly dissented on the ground that a "hot cargo" clause violated the policy of the act.
23 Rabouin v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 906.
24 Judge Learned Hand dissented in this case, but on a ground that made it unnecessary for him to pass on the effect of the "hot cargo" clause.
25 Section 102 of Title I of the LMRA was the controlling provision. 61 Stat. L. 152
(1947), 29 u.s.c. (1952) §168.
26 Rabouin v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 906 at 911.
27 While the NLRB did not stress the fact that the secondary employer.; actually
acquiesced, the majority nevertheless stated: "And each of the employers, apparently
mindful of its contractual obligation, acquiesced in its employees' refusal to handle the
'hot' cargo." Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 at 981 (1949).
28 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953). Even in this case the Board pointed out (at 743-744) that
"with but one belated exception, the employers herein affirmed the contracts by acquiescing in their enforcement during the period of the Respondent's refusal to handle
Pittsburgh's unfair goods."
29 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 at 744 (1953).
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union's forcing or requiring any employer . . . to cease doing
business with any other person."30
The impetus that these two decisions gave to the "hot cargo"
clauses became manifest both in the redrafting of clauses by unions31 and by denials of section 10 (Z) injunctions in cases in which
they were involved. 32

III.

Effect of the McAllister Decision

As could be imagined, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction
among employers with the Conway doctrine. The arguments
against it are variously phrased, but the central theme is that "hot
cargo" clauses are merely contractual secondary boycotts and violate the policy of section 8 (b) (4) (A). Put in more colorful language, it was said that "the 'hot cargo'. arrangement is nothing
more than the old secondary boycott clothed in a new raiment of
would-be-respectability. But the sheep's clothing should not conceal the wolf from the eyes of the law."33 It was in this setting that
the Board reconsidered the Conway <;l.octrine in the McAllister
case.
A. Opinion of Members Rodgers and Beeson. These members felt that Congress declared a public policy against all secondary boycotts, without distinction as to type or kind. 34 They stressed
30 Id. at 744.
31 The cartage

agreement to which the secondary employers in the McAllister case
were parties stated: "There shall be a· record understanding that, in the event the decision
of the National Labor Relations Board in the Conway case ... is sustained or prevails on
appeal to the higher Federal Courts, this Article will be renegotiated and rewritten to
provide the Union with the maximum of protection afforded by such decision." ll0
N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1775 (1954). As a result of this clause, the agreement was modified.
This modification was not effective until after the §10 (l) injunction had been issued by
the district court and thus had no effect on the decision in this case. ll0 N.L.R.B. 1769
at 1775 (1954).
32 Madden v. Local 442, IBT-AFL, (D.C. Wis. 1953) ll4 F. Supp. 932. Contra, Humphrey v. Local 294, IBT-AFL, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 25 L.R.R.M. 2318.
33 Lloyd and Wessel, "Public Policy and Secondary Boycotts,'' 23 UNIV. CIN. L. REv.
31 at 53 (1954).
34 They quoted Senator Taft's statements in the course of legislative debate, where
he said: "The Senator will find a great many decisions . . . which hold that under the
common law a secondary boycott is unlawful. Subsequently, under the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary boycott or any other kind
of a strike, no matter how unlawful it may have been at common law. All this provision
[§8 (b) (4) (A)] of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts.
It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad ~econdary boycotts.
Our committee heard: evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us
any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have so broadened the
provisions dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice."
93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947).
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the fact that the pre-enactment material on section 8 (b) (4) (A)
emphasizes the aim of the protection of the public welfare and not
merely the vindication of private rights. 35 They relied on section
10 (a) of the amended NLRA as meaning that private contracts
do not prevent the Board from acting in the public interest.36
They stated that "Congress deliberately banned the inducement
or encouragement in Section 8 (b) (4) (A) outright . . . and did
not say that this is proscribed unless there is a contract provision
permitting it to occur. . . . " 37 They felt that Congress was well
aware of the uniform rule of the Board and the courts that contracts in violation of the policy of the act were void, and thus there
was no need to provide so specifically. Finally, they disagreed
completely with the "course of . . . employment" argument
presented in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. case.38 They argued
that these words have a technical and well established meaning in
the law (particularly in cases interpreting workmen's compensation laws39 ) and that they were used here merely to point up the
fact that a distinction is to be drawn under section 8 (b) (4) (A) between employees in their capacity as employees, and employees in
35 For example, the Senate Report stated that: "Because of the nature of certain of
these practices, especially ..• secondary boycotts ••• the committee is convinced that
additional procedures must be made available under the National Labor Relations Act
in order adequately to protect the public welfare which is inextricably involved in labor
disputes . ..• Hence, we have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and
not in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief••.•" S. Rep. 105,
80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8 (1947). Italics added by the Board.
36 Section 10 (a) states that "the Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce, This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise..••" 61 Stat. L. 146 (1947), 29
U.S.C. (1952) §160. Italics added. This has been interpreted to mean that private contracts do not affect the Board's power. See generally, Amalgamated Utility Workers (CIO)
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 60 S.Ct. 561 (1940); National Licorice Co. v.
NLRB, 309 U.S. 250, 60 S.Ct. 569 (1940); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct.
576 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 64 S.Ct. 830 (1944); NLRB
v. General Motors Corp., (7th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 306.
37 McAllister Transfer, Inc., HO N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1780 (1954).
38 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953).
89 6 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT, perm. ed., 19-20 (1948) defines this
phrase as follows: "In the course of employment points to the time, place, and circumstances under which an accident takes place, and simply means 'while the employment
was in progress.' " For an example of the broad sweep given this language by the Supreme
Court, see Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 288 U.S. 162, 53 S.Ct. 380, 87
A.L.R. 245 (1933). From these definitions it seems that the employees of the secondary
carriers would have been "in the course of employment" if they had been injured handling McAllister freight (some of these employees did handle one shipment of McAllister
freight-clothing and medicine for a chi~dren's home) and there is 1?-o apparent r~ason_ to
give these words a different meaning m §8 (b) (4) (A). For the view of the dissenting
members on this point, see note 52 infra.

260

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

their capacity as private consumers_. In conclusion, they recommended overruling the Conway and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
decisions to the extent they were inconsistent with their views. 40
It may be contended that the ·Rodgers-Beeson analysis proves
too much, for Congress did not in fact proscribe all secondary
boycotts.41 But the answer is that the type of secondary activity
underlying the "hot cargo" situation is the critical point and that
this is a type which Congress did intend to prohibit, iqespective
of the presence of a "hot cargo" clause. This position has considerable support in the pre-enactment material. Thus, the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, in explaining the
kind of activity at which section 8 (b) (4) (A) was particularly directed, stated:
"This paragraph also makes it an unfair labor practice for
a union to engage in the type of secondary boycott that has
been conducted in New York City by Local No. 3 of !BEW,
whereby electricians have refused to install electrical products
of manufacturers employing electricians who are members of
some labor organization other than Local No. 3 (See testimony of R. S. Edwards, vol. I, P. 176 et seq.; Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local No. 3, !BEW, 325 U.S. 797)."42
It is significant that the kind of activity in which Local No. 3 had
engaged was a product boycott, sanctioned by a type of "hot cargo"
clause. There was also a great deal of material presented at the
hearings on secondary boycotts in the trucking industry,43 and this
clearly influenced some members of Congress. Senator Ball, in
offering an amendment to the Senate bill which would have given
private parties, as well as the General Counsel, authority to apply
directly to federal district courts for injunctions in secondary boycott cases,44 stated:
40 This position is basically the same as that taken by Member Reynolds in Conway's
Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 at 988 (1949). It has been accepted by only one court prior to
the McAllister decision. See Humphrey v. Local 294, IBT-AFL, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 25
L.R.R.M. 2318 (1954).
41 See 48 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 735 at 739-740 (1954).
42 S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 22 (1947).
43 See testimony of M. J. Mulvihill, H. Hearings before the Committee on Education
and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 256-347 (1947); testimony of H. L. Strobel, id. at 702742; testimony of P. C. Turner, id. at 1840-1859.
44 This amendment was not passed, but much of its language was incorporated into
a substitute amendment, §303, which gives private parties a damage remedy for the same
action proscribed in §8 (b) (4). 61 Stat. L. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §187.
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"the secondary boycott is one of the most vicious abuses of
economic power now being indulged in by labor unions. It
is being used . . . virtually to dictate the terms on which
small businessmen, farmers, and other persons may do business with each other. In the Philadelphia, Baltimore, and
New York markets, the farmers hauling their produce are
compelled to obey 100 percent every rule laid down by the
teamsters' union, or they cannot do business .... " 45
These and other statements in the pre-enactment material hardly
support the view that Congress intended to exempt contractual
secondary boycotts from the sweep of section 8 (b) (4) (A).
B. Concurring Opinion of Chairman Farmer. Chairman
Farmer agreed that the Teamsters had engaged in secondary activity in violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A), despite the "hot cargo"
clause, but he distinguished this case from Conway 46 in that here~
unlike Conway~ the employees acted contrary to explicit instructions from their employer. He felt that the refusal to follow the
notices published by the secondary carriers was a type of "refusal"
covered by section 8 (b) (4) (.~).
It is submitted that this analysis is sound. It is supported by
the language of the statute as well as by the available evidence of
congressional intent. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) makes it an unfair labor
practice for a union " . . . to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in . . . a concerted refusal . . . to
transport . . . where an object is: (A) forcing or requiring any
employer . . . to cease . . . handling, transporting, . . . or to
cease doing business with any other person." The "hot cargo'"
clause goes primarily-to the element of "refusal" and the chairman
rightly held that there can be a refusal whether or not there is ai.
"hot cargo" clause.47 It is true that this non-acquiescence by the
employer might be a violation of the collective agreement but this
does not change the character of the empl?yees' conduct.
REC. 4836 (1947).
chairman limited his opinion to the factual distinctions between the two cases.
He stated: "However, I do not find it necessary, or even appropriate, to overrule the
Board's Conway decision; nor would I go so far as to characterize the 'hot cargo' provision ... as being contrary to public policy." McAllister Transfer, Inc., IIO N.L.R.B. 1769
at 1788 (1954). Cf. Sand Door & Plywood Co., ll3 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478
(1955).
47 This is not only in accord with the common meaning of the word "refusal" but it is
precisely the word used in the "hot cargo" clause here in question. See note 9 supra and
adjacent text.
45

93

CONG.

46 The
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This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that a "hot
cargo" clause exists at the will of the employer.48 This is so because it seems clear that a union could not lawfully strike to get a
"hot cargo" clause.49 If a union could do so, the legality of a
secondary boycott would turn on whether the union properly
planned its strike or organizing campaign. For example, if union
U wished to organize employer R and felt that it would need to
put some secondary economic pressure on him, it could first strike
employer A (a principal customer or supplier of R) for a "hot
cargo" clause, then strike R and rely on the clause as a defense to
any proceeding against it resulting from the secondary pressure
on A.50
,

C. Dissenting Opinion of Members Murdock and Peterson.
Members Murdock and Peterson would have sustained the trial
examiner's intermediate report. They felt that the legislative
history of the LMRA did not justify the conclusion that "hot
cargo" clauses ~e against public policy. In their view, the public
interest discussed by Members Rodgers and Beeson is a policy of
protecting neutral, secondary employers who become involved
involuntarily in a labor dispute when they do not have any real
conflict with their employees,51 and employers can waive this
statutory protection by entering into contracts containing "hot
cargo" clauses. Members Murdock and Peterson also disagreed
with Chairman Farmer's analysis. They felt that non-acquiescence
by the secondary employers had not been proved merely by show48 There is clearly no provision in the act which prevents· an employer from dealing
or not dealing with any otlier employer. This is not quite the situation when a common
carrier, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act or similar state law, is involved. See
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., (D.C. Ore. 1953, 1954) 128 F.
Supp. 475, 520.
49 While this seems to come within the proscription of §8 (b) (4)(A), there is no clear
decision on the point. In fact the NLRB in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740
at 744, n. 6 (1953), specifically refused to pass on this question.
50 The clear language of §8 (b) (4) (A) would seem to prevent a union from striking to
enforce a "hot cargo" clause. This section makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
" ..• (4) to engage in .•. a strike ... where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring
any employer ..• to cease doing business with any other person.•.." Despite this seemingly clear language, it is on this point that the Teamsters may seek to avoid the impact
of the McAllister decision. It is submitted that this attempt will succeed only in those
cases where the general counsel is unable to prove that "an object" of the strike was the
secondary boycott. For an example of this attempt see, "New 'Hot Cargo' Clause Negotiated by Teamsters," 35 LAB. REL. REP. 259 (1955).
51 To support this position the dissent quotes several committee reports and statements
made in the course of legislative debate which clearly show that the protection of neutral
employers was :lt least one of the objects behind §8 (b) (4) (A). See McAllister Transfer,
Inc., llO N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1792 (1954).

1955]

COMMENTS

263

ing the posting of notices ordering their employees not to discriminate, but that even if it had, the contractual obligation of
the employer should be binding on him.
These arguments were simply a restatement of the reasoning
used in the Conway opinion.6 This reasoning, as Members
Rodgers and Beeson pointed out, emphasizes only one of the evils
of secondary action.53 It is the difference in the interpretation of
the public policy basis of the act that leads to the divergence of
views concerning the application of the waiver-of-protection doctrine, as exemplified by the "hot cargo" clause. Thus if section
8 (b) (4) (A) was intended only for the protection of the secondary
employer, he might be able to waive it. However, this argument
fails if the general public welfare is also considered.54 Since the
pre-enactment material indicates that Congress was concerned with
the effect on the general public as well as the effect on the secondary employer, it can certainly be argued that the waiver-of-protection doctrine is inapplicable when applied to section 8 (b) (4) (A).
The dissenters' attempt to refute the analysis of Chairman
Farmer is not convincing. They based their repudiation of his
position on the assertion that the secondary employers really
did acquiesce in the employees' conduct and thus there was no
"refusal" by them. This argument ignores the realities of the
situation. A secondary employer might vehemently object to
putting pressure on a customer or supplier but he might not (from
a purely practical standpoint) be willing to discharge or discipline
recalcitrant employees for fear of getting himself involved in a
!)

52 It is significant to note that the dissent does not place any real reliance on the
"course of ... employment" argument made in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. case. They
state, " . . . while we do not say that the interpretation which Members Rodgers and
Beeson would give to the phrase is lacking in merit, we cannot agree that their construction is any more an expression of Congressional intent than was the Board's interpreta_tion
in the Pittsburgh case." McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1797 (1954).
Chairman Farmer and Member Leedom have adopted Member Rodgers' views on this
point. See Sand Door & Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 at 1481
(1955).
63 The very purpose of the LMRA, as stated in §1 (b), is "to define and proscribe
practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical
to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor
disputes affecting coipmerce." 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §141 (b). It would
seem that a secondary boycott in the transportation industry is one place where the "rights
of the public" are dearly involved, for these boycotts invariably keep the goods of many
shippers "tied up" when they would otherwise be promptly delivered.
54 See 12 AM. JUR., Contracts §166 (1938).
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strike.55 This is surely not acquiesence in any true sense of the
word.56 Thus, while the dissent presented a plausible answer to
the opinion of Members Rodgers and Beeson,57 it did not satisfactorily answer Chairman Farmer.58
IV. The Law After the McAllister Gase
It is submitted that the opinioh express~d by Chairman Farmer
in the McAllister case, that "hot cargo" clauses are not invalid per
se but that they can furnish a valid defense to an action under section 8 (b) (4) (A) only if they are acquiesced in by the employer, is
the most plausible application of the law. However, as this case
was handed down on the last day Member Beeson sat on the National Labor Relations Board,59 there was considerable speculation as to just what position Member Leedom60 would assume. 61
This question was answered in Sand Door & Plywood Go. 62 In
this case Member Leedom joined with Chairman Farmer in the
majority opinion. 63 Despite the fact that there was no notice
55 It is true that this strike might be a violation of §8 (b) (4) (A), but the employer
might not feel that his legal rights were worth getting involved in a lawsuit when, for
example, such involvement might do him considerable harm from a public relations
standpoint.
56 The word "acquiescence" carries no connotation of avowed consent or of opposition.
It is defined as "a silent appearance of consent. . . . Failure to make _any objections." 1
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 114.
57 The dissent showed that the pre-enactment material does not conclusively indicate
a congressional intent to outlaw "hot cargo" clauses.
58 The dissenters would have disagreed with Chairman Farmer's opinion even if they
had felt that non-acquiescence had been proved. They stated that they were not convinced
that the Board should countenance such a repudiation of a collective agreement when
the result would be that the other party would be guilty of an unfair labor practice.
McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1791 (1954).
59 The position of the Board members remained substantially unchanged in a similar
case decided on the same day as the McAllister case. See Reilly Cartage Co., 110 N.L.R.B.
1742 (1954).
60 Member Leedom was appointed to the National Labor Relations Board for a five
year term effective December 17, 1954, the day after the McAllister decision was handed
down.
61 Meanwhile the district courts properly assumed that Chairman Farmer's opinion
represented the present shape of the law. See Douds v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees
Local No. 680, IBT-AFL, (D.C. N.J. 1955) 36 L.R.R.M. 2410. Cf. Graham v. International
Woodworkers of America, Local 7-140, CIO, (D.C. Ore. 1955) 36 L.R.R.M. 2243.
62113 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1955). In simplified form the facts are as
follows: U had a contract containing a "hot cargo" clause with Company X. U found out
that X was installing some nonunion doors manufactured by Company Y and supplied
by Sand Door. U then told Z, a foreman who was also a union member in charge of
enforcing union rules relating to the use of nonunion goods, the status of the doors. He
in turn passed the word around and no more of these doors were installed.
63 The position of Members Rodgers, Peterson and Murdock remained substantially
unchanged in this case.
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posted by the employer to indicate his non-acquiescence, the new
majority was apparently willing to say that the "hot cargo" clause
did not even give the union the right to go direc#y to the employees and tell them of their "rights" under the contract. 64 This
could be read as completely nullifying all "hot cargo" clauses, but
there are indications in the opinion that the majority was not prepared to go this far. They expressly refused to hold these clauses
void as against the policy of the act and they also stated that "this
is essentially the view expressed by Chairman Farmer in his concurring opinion in the McAllister case. . . .'' 65 There is still
some life left in the non-acquiescence theory of Chairman Farmer.
It is true that this non-acquiescence may not require an express
employer repudiation, but some expression of disapproval, e.g., a
standing rule not to discriminate in receiving or shipping freight,
may still be necessary.
It is important to note that the decision in Sand Door & Plywood Co. was handed down one day before the term of office of
Chairman Farmer expired. Thus the Board is evenly divided on
the question as of this ·writing. If the next member agrees with
either Member Rodgers or with Member Leedom, the Board's
position will not change. However, if he should agree with Members Murdock and Peterson, the Conway doctrine will become reestablished. Another event which might change the present shape
of the law would be an appeal. It seems certain that one of the
current cases in this area will be taken to a court of appeals for enforcement, for the subject is one of vital concern to many of the
nation's largest labor organizations66 and employer associations.67
The importance of the problem clearly points to the desirability
of congressional clarification. However, in view of the political
difficulties attending any attempt to amend the Taft-Hartley Act,
it seems likely that labor and management will have to live with
the Board and court dispositions of "hot cargo" clauses.

Jack G. Armstrong, S.Ed.
64 Sand Door &: Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B.
65 Id. at 1481, n. 20.
66 The CIO has rarely found it advisable

No. 123, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 at 1481 (1955).

to use "hot cargo" clauses. These clauses
are found in practically all Teamster contracts, however, and in a great many of the contracts negotiated by unions in the construction and printing industries.
67 The employer associations in the trucking business have a particularly vital concern
in this area, as they see themselves being put into an impossible situation. For example,
if they agree to a "hot cargo" clause and acquiesce in its operation, they are subject to
damages for violation of their responsibilities as a common carrier under the doctrine of
Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., (D.C. Ore. 1953, 1954) 128 F.

